Notes
1 This is how Alan Robock, a climatologist researching climate engineering, recently put the status of solar geoengineering (Robock (2020: 59)).
2 For the notion of ‘matched struggles’, see Baker (2017).
3 I focus here on the hearings, reports, and documents that appear in the studied corpus of US policy records on climate engineering (see Appendix for document corpus).
4 Keller (2009: 95). In a similar vein, Hilgartner has unpacked the ‘drama’ of science advice in his book, Science on Stage, where he describes the technical reports by the US National Academies as stylised productions (Hilgartner 2000).
5 Bentley Allan describes a similar process for the establishment of climate change as a governance object. He suggests that issues are designated, translated, and problematised as they take political shape and become objects of governance (Allan 2017).
6 See also Smallman (2020). Literature in Science and Technology Studies has illustrated the role of science in determining essential parameters of policy debates particularly in technical decision-making contexts (see, e.g., Pickersgill (2011); Hurlbut (2015)).
7 Keller (2009).
8 US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 222).
9 US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2010b: 43).
10 US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 222).
11 Gupta and Möller (2019); see also Owen (2014).
12 Gupta and Möller (2019: 480).
13 See, e.g., Bellamy and others (2012) for a systematic assessment of various geoengineering appraisals.
14 US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 27f.).
15 Gupta and Möller (2019: 484).
16 See, particularly, US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009).
17 The initial 1992 report defines climate engineering primarily as an economical approach to tackling climate change, drawing on simple and largely favourable economic assessments and cost estimates, for which the report continues to be politically mobilised. See, e.g., (see, e.g., Lane in US House of Representatives, Committee on Government Reform (2006: 85); Schnare in US Senate 2007c: 109, 113). The 2015 volumes, in contrast, reflect the discursive shift that marked the political renaissance of climate engineering since the early 2000s and discusses climate engineering as a potential last resort for addressing increasingly dangerous impacts of climate change (US National Research Council (2015a, 2015b)).
18 US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009); US Government Accountability Office (2010a: 19; 2010b); Lattanzio and Barbour (2010); Bracmort and Lattanzio (2013); Bracmort, Lattanzio, and Barbour (2013). The IPCC reports AR 4 and AR5, too, refer to ‘geo-engineering’ (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007, 2013)).
19 Royal Society (2009: ix). The House Science Committee defined geoengineering as ‘the deliberate large-scale modification of the earth’s climate systems for the purposes of counteracting climate change’ (US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 3)). See also the position statements of the American Geophysical Union (2009) and the American Meteorological Society (2013).
20 US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2010b: IV).
21 US Government Accountability Office (2010a, 2010b, 2011).
22 US National Research Council (2015a: viii).
23 In 2019, for example, Representative Jerry McNerney introduced the Atmospheric Climate Intervention Act (H.R.5519, 2019); the 2020 Congressional Action Plan on Solving the Climate Crisis, too, refers to ‘atmospheric climate intervention’ measures; US House of Representatives, Select Committee on the Climate Crisis (2020: 525). See also US Global Change Research Program (2017) as the report refers to climate intervention (CI) measures.
24 See, e.g., Morrow (2014); Katz (2015); Baatz, Heyward, and Stelzer (2016); McLaren (2018); King (2019); Fiekowsky (2019).
25 US National Research Council (2015a, 2015b).
26 For an overview of these approaches, see, e.g., US National Research Council (2015a); Royal Society (2009).
27 Royal Society (2009: 6). This definition excludes measures which seek to capture CO2 directly at the point of emission, such as carbon capture and storage, Carbon Sequestration from point sources, as ‘clean coal’, or in combination with bioenergy (BECCS), since the point of these measures is not to modify the climate, but rather to avoid further emissions to the atmosphere.
28 US National Research Council (2015a: 5; see also 67f.).
29 See, e.g., US National Research Council (2015a: 75f.).
30 US National Research Council (2015a: 56).
31 US National Research Council (2015a: 58).
32 For an overview see, e.g., US National Research Council (2015b); Royal Society (2009).
33 US National Research Council (2015a: viii). The National Research Council argued that albedo modification would be the ‘physically more descriptive’ term.
34 See, e.g., Latham and others (2012).
35 See, e.g., Pierce and others (2010).
36 Keith in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 148).
37 Tollefson (2018).
38 See Caldeira in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 23) for a taxonomy of the various relevant CDR approaches.
39 US National Research Council (2015a: 4).
40 See, e.g., Lane in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 36; 31) and particularly Lackner’s statement (168f.). Moniz and others (2019: 10); US House of Representatives, Select Committee on the Climate Crisis (2020).
41 US House of Representatives, Select Committee on the Climate Crisis (2020: 276).
42 US House of Representatives, Select Committee on the Climate Crisis (2020: 279).
43 US Government Accountability Office qtd. in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 260). See also Royal Society (2009: 18). For a list of research and experiments in the area of ocean fertilisation, see also Oceanos (2018).
44 Lawrence and Crutzen in Blackstock and Low (2019: 90).
45 Lawrence and Crutzen in Blackstock and Low (2019: 90).
46 Keith in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 148); see also US National Research Council (2015b: 4).
47 See, e.g., US National Research Council (2015b: 4).
48 This argument has its merit, of course, but it would also have to be applied to assessments of carbon dioxide removal, as neither of these approaches addresses human behaviour or emissions technologies as the anthropogenic causes of climate change.
49 US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 7, 26). See also Hale (2012); and Lin (2013). The literature has pointed out, however, that it is difficult to demonstrate such a causal mechanism between anticipated risk and behaviour, especially in the case of technological concepts which most people remain unfamiliar with so far.
50 See, e.g., US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 31, 149 f.).
51 See, particularly, Robock in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 48f.).
52 Barrett in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 315); see also Lane, Keith in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 39, 150).
53 See, particularly, Rasch in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 32, 39, 159, 161, 210 etc.); critical of this need, see Robock and Fleming in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 45, 127). For an illustration of prerequisites of successful field studies, see for example, Robock in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 50f., 119).
54 See, particularly, Rasch in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 158f.).
55 See, e.g., Keith or Rasch in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 149, 154).
56 Rasch in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 157). See also, e.g., Robock, Rasch, Rusco, or Morgan in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 45, 49, 119, 212, 252, 279).
57 US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 123).
58 See, e.g., US Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works (2007: 14ff., 21, 47, 122, 150).
59 National Research Council (2015a: viii).
60 US National Academy of Sciences (2019, 2020); see also Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2005, 2019).
61 US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 219f.); US Government Accountability Office (2010a, 2010b, 2011); US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2010b); Bracmort and Lattanzio (2013); US House of Representatives, Select Committee on the Climate Crisis (2020).
62 In March 2010, the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC), a think tank based in Washington D.C., for example, established a ‘Task Force on Climate Remediation Research’ to advise the US government on a strategy regarding climate engineering. In 2011, it presented its ‘National Strategic Plan’ (Long and others (2011)). In 2019 former Secretary of Energy, Ernest J. Moniz, presented a report via his Energy Futures Initiative which provided ‘detailed implementation plans’ for a federal program that would push commercial readiness of CDR measures (Moniz and others (2019: 1)). The report argued that a ‘whole-of-government approach’ would be necessary ‘that reaches the mission responsibilities and research expertise’ (Moniz and others (2019: 1)).
63 US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2010b: V).
64 US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 222).
65 US Government Accountability Office (2010b: 4–5).
66 US Government Accountability Office (2010b: 5–6), emphasis added.
67 US Government Accountability Office (2010b).
68 US Government Accountability Office (2010b: 18).
69 See summary in US Government Accountability Office (2010b).
70 US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 220f.); Bracmort and Lattanzio (2013). The CRS presented its findings already in 2010, but it has provided an updated version of its assessment since then. In the UK, parallel efforts were undertaken and condensed into a report on ‘The Regulation of Geoengineering’, which was published by the Science Committee in March of 2010.
71 US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2010b: 2).
72 See, particularly, the tabular overview in US Government Accountability Office (2010b: 31); and Bracmort and Lattanzio (2013: 29f.). For a general overview of relevant governance assessments and frameworks (2009–2015), see Morrow (2017).
73 See, e.g., US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 8, 21, 50, 112, 122, 130, etc.).
74 US Government Accountability Office (2010b: 26).
75 Bracmort and Lattanzio (2013: 22).
76 US House of Representatives, 111th Congress (2009: 33).
77 Gordon in US House of Representatives, US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2010b: 79).
78 Lubchenco in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2010a: 79).
79 US House of Representatives, 112th Congress (2012: 28).
80 US House of Representatives, 112th Congress (2012: 28).
81 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2010: 3).
82 Baker (2017).
83 The alternative short title of the bill is America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science Act.
84 Public Law 110–69 (2007).
85 H.R.5519 (2019).
86 H.R.5519 (2019).
87 H.R.5519 (2019).
88 Aside from the Barrasso bills, there were, for example, the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill 2016 and the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, which assigned funds to the Department of Energy to develop and commercialise direct air capture technology (US Senate, 114th Congress (2015: 82ff.); Public Law 114–113 (2015)). In July 2019, Congressman Marc Veasey introduced the Fossil Energy Research and Development Act of 2019 which, if enacted, would direct the Department of Energy to establish ‘one or more test centers… to provide unique testing capabilities for innovative direct air capture and storage technologies’ (H.R.3607, 2019). And in January of 2020, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce presented a discussion draft for its CLEAN Future Act. The Act would task the DOE with establishing ‘a direct air capture technology prize program’ for facilities which ‘capture CO2 directly from the ambient air and capture more than 10,000 metric tons of CO2 annually’ (US House of Representatives, Committee on Energy and Commerce (2020: 14)).
89 US House of Representatives, Select Committee on the Climate Crisis (2020: 281).
90 S.2744 (2009); S. 757 (2011); S.383 (2019). A number of additional documents simply list or discuss these suggested bills. See for example US Senate, 112th Congress (2011); US Senate, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources (2011); Wyden (2013).
91 S.2744 (2009: 2); S.757 (2011: 2).
92 S.383 (2019: 2).
93 S.383 (2019: 4).
94 ‘Algae carbon bio-capture is at a pilot-to-commercial stage at three coal-fired power plants in Australia. In the Land Down Under, they are advancing free enterprise deploying US technology. In the Land of the Manhattan Project and putting Men on the Moon, a prize short sells our proprietary knowledge. We as a Nation are better than this. Amending this bill should include financial and legislative support’ (US Senate, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources (2011: 36)).
95 S.757 (2011: 3–4).
96 S.2744 (2009: 2); S.757 (2011: 2).
97 US House of Representatives, Select Committee on the Climate Crisis (2020: 278).
98 US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 5, 48, 54, 123, 172, 263ff.); US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2010b: 28f.).
99 Pielke (2000a: 13). See tabular overview of the programs agency responsibilities in Pielke (2000a: 12).