1 President’s Science Advisory Committee (1965).

2 President’s Science Advisory Committee (1965: 127).

3 See also Keith (2000: 254).

4 Keith (2000: 253); Kwa in Miller and Edwards (2001: 152).

5 Bendiner qtd. in Lewis (1985: 6).

6 Haas (1992: 9).

7 Lewis (1985: 6).

8 Andrews (2010: 226).

9 Andrews (2010: 223).

10 Andrews (2010: 227).

11 Turner and Isenberg (2018).

12 Lewis (1985: 7).

13 Andrews (2010: 227).

14 See, e.g., Table 1–1 in Turner and Isenberg (2018: 33).

15 Turner and Isenberg (2018: 32).

16 Turner and Isenberg (2018: 21).

17 Weingast (2005: 326).

18 Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate (1988: 39). In hindsight, this incident has been stylised as a crucial moment to the career of global warming (see, e.g., Pielke (2010: 9); Fleming (2010: 225); Morton (2016: 91f.)).

19 Shabecoff (1988).

20 Weart (2008: 140). For the rise of climate ‘catastrophism’ (Katastrophismus) in Germany, see, e.g., Weingart, Engels, and Pansegrau (2008).

21 See, particularly, Miller and Edwards (2001); Miller (2004). In his analysis, Climate Science and the Making of a Global Political Order, Clark Miller suggests how climate change was but one of several prominent issues that became re-conceptualised during the 1980s and 1990s ‘in explicitly global terms’ (Miller (2004: 49)).

22 Shabecoff (1988). For a concise overview of this shifting problematisation of climate change, see Keith (2000: 257ff.). For relevant expert assessments from the 1960s, see, e.g., US National Research Council (1965); see also US President’s Science Advisory Committee (1965). For relevant expert assessments from the 1970s, see, e.g., US National Academy of Sciences (1977); see also Study of Critical Environmental Problems (1970).

23 Miller and Edwards (2001: 7).

24 Keller (2009: 219).

25 See, particularly, Meadows and Club of Rome (1972). For a critical perspective, see, e.g., Taylor and Buttel (1992).

26 Ulrich Beck published his diagnosis of the risk society during that same year (Beck (1986)).

27 Keith (2000: 253). In his analysis, The Rise and Fall of Weather Modification, Chungling Kwa suggested that ‘it is tempting to think that at some point [the] practical and theoretical impossibility [of climate modification] imposed itself so strongly on the meteorological community that the field was simply abandoned. This appears not to be so. Rather, the demise of deliberate weather and climate modification appears linked to the growth of environmental concerns’ (Kwa in Miller and Edwards (2001: 152)).

28 Kellogg and Schneider (1974).

29 Kellogg and Schneider (1974: 1163).

30 Weart (2008: 19–38).

31 For a similar argument, see Baker (2017: 19–21).

32 Baker (2017: 19).

33 Turner and Isenberg (2018: 33). Of course, not all scientists agreed with this new role. Some climate scientists tried to actively counteract the environmental movement in an effort to safeguard their position within the state (see, particularly, McCright and Dunlap (2003); Lahsen (2008)).

34 Marchetti (1977).

35 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, United Nations Environment Program, and Titus (1990).

36 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, United Nations Environment Program, and Titus (1990: 108); US Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works (1997: 131).

37 US Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works (1997: 3, 13, 15, 24, 26, etc.).

38 US Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works (1997: 1f.).

39 Kellogg and Schneider (1974: 1163).

40 Schneider in US Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works (1997: 130).

41 US National Academy of Sciences (1992).

42 US Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works (1997: 130).

43 See, e.g., Weart (2008: 139f.).

44 Taylor and Buttel (1992: 405).

45 Pielke (2000a: 16).

46 Pielke (2000a: 16).

47 For an instructive account of the career of biodiversity loss, see Hannigan (2006).

48 Wilson (2006); Hannigan (2006: 128).

49 US National Academy of Sciences (1977: 7).

50 Pielke (2000a: 11–12).

51 Keller (2009: 102).

52 Pielke (2000a: 12).

53 Pielke (2000a: 14). See also Fleagle (1986: 56).

54 Pielke (2000a: 17).

55 Pielke (2000a: 17).

56 Pielke (2000a: 19).

57 Pielke (2000a: 23).

58 Pielke (2000b: 136).

59 Pielke (2000b: 136).

60 Pielke (2000a: 10).

61 This rising political interest in climate change of course entailed structural dynamics within science as well. As Spencer Weart observed: ‘Specialists in the quirks of the stratosphere, volcanoes, ocean chemistry, ecosystems, and so forth found themselves sharing the same funding agencies, institutions, and even university buildings’ (2008: 144).

62 Pielke (2000a: 13).

63 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2017).

64 Fleming (2010: 226).

65 Nierenberg, Tschinkel, and Tschinkel (2010: 219); see also Pielke (2000a: 13). This also explains why the Department of Energy emerged as one of the most relevant organisations, providing climate change expertise within US policy during the late 1970s.

66 Nierenberg, Tschinkel, and Tschinkel (2010: 219).

67 See, particularly, MacDonald and others (1979); US National Research Council (1979); US National Research Council (1982, 1983); US National Academies of Sciences (1992).

68 Schelling in US National Research Council (1983: 449).

69 US National Academy of Sciences (1977: ix).

70 Andrews (2006: 223).

71 US National Academy of Sciences (1977: ix, emphasis in original).

72 For the suggestion of fertilising the oceans, see, e.g., US National Academy of Sciences (1977: 6).

73 US National Academy of Sciences (1977: 13).

74 US National Research Council (1982: xv). See also Nierenberg, Tschinkel, and Tschinkel (2010: 319).

75 US National Research Council (1983: 58–59).

76 US National Academy of Sciences (1992: 28).

77 The featured papers were, for example, Marland (1996); Schneider (1996); Bodansky (1996). According to Oldham and others, the publication of this issue sparked ‘a first significant spike’ in publication activity on climate engineering (Oldham and others 2014: 149).

78 See, e.g., Stilgoe (2015: 162).

79 Budyko (1977). See also Fleming (2010: 241).

80 Marchetti (1977). See also Schneider (1996: 292).

81 IPCC, United Nations Environment Program, and Titus (1990).

82 Marchetti (1977: 59).

83 See, e.g., Lawrence and Crutzen in Blackstock and Low (2019: 90).

84 US National Research Council (1983: 449).

85 Schelling in US National Research Council (1983: 469).

86 Schelling in US National Research Council (1983: 469).

87 US National Academy of Sciences (1992: 460).

88 ‘To date, the policy cart has been careering far in front of the scientific horse. Presidents convene climate conclaves. Prime ministers declaim on the need to reduce CO₂ emissions. Even a distinguished international panel of scientists, who should know better, calls for a 60% cut in these emissions. Yet, like most declarations of war, these calls to arms against global warming have been made without an attempt to weigh the costs and benefits of restraints’ (Nordhaus (1990)).

89 Nordhaus (1990: 19). See also Nordhaus (1992: 1317).

90 Schelling (1996).

91 Schelling (1996: 306).

92 Schelling (1996: 303).

93 Schelling (1996: 306).

94 Turner and Isenberg (2018).

95 Turner and Isenberg (2018: 8); see also Jacques, Dunlap, and Freeman (2008).

96 Turner and Isenberg (2018: 17).

97 Turner and Isenberg (2018: 157).

98 See, e.g., McCright and Dunlap (2003).