Notes
1 Kintisch (2010).
2 Fleming (2010: 253).
3 Roman and Carson (2009: 55).
4 Turner and Isenberg (2018: 181).
5 See, e.g., Kincaid and Roberts (2013); Turner and Isenberg (2018: 180f.).
6 See, e.g., Roman and Carson (2009); Kincaid and Roberts (2013); Chait (2013); Turner and Isenberg (2018).
7 See, e.g., Figure 4–4 in Turner and Isenberg (2018: 185).
8 Notably, this was despite the fact that the administration had pushed some relevant climate legislation. Kincaid and Roberts (2013). See also, e.g., Roman and Carson (2009); Kincaid and Roberts (2013); Chait (2013); Turner and Isenberg (2018).
9 Kincaid and Roberts (2013: 47).
10 Kincaid and Roberts (2013: 48).
11 Political attention to ocean fertilisation seemed largely favourable during these years (see, e.g., US House of Representatives, Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming (2007: 95); US Senate, Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (2007); S.2307 (2008: 20ff.); US Senate, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development of the Committee on Appropriations (2009: 42); US House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies of the Committee on Appropriations (2009: 304); US House of Representatives, 111th Congress (2009: 33)). In 2009, however, the US House of Representatives passed the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (not enacted), which sought to implement a so-called cap and trade system in the United States (H.R.2454 (2009)). And while the proposed bill called for a national Carbon Sequestration strategy which would have included climate engineering approaches – sequestration is defined in the text as ‘the separation, isolation, or removal of greenhouse gases from the atmosphere […]’ – the bill explicitly excluded ocean fertilisation measures (H.R.2454 (2009: 1389)). The Senate version of this bill ultimately failed ‘due to lack of support and political capital’ (Kincaid and Roberts (2013: 44)).
12 S.2307 (2008: 5).
13 S.2307 (2008: 2).
14 S.2307 (2008: 5–6).
15 S.2307 (2008: 20ff.). The original bill, as introduced by John Kerry on 5 November 2007 did not yet contain any reference to ocean fertilisation; this was only added in the reported 2008 version of the bill.
16 See also Mitchell (2002).
17 US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 35).
18 Scott (1998).
19 Some of the findings from this section have been published in Schubert (2019, 2021).
20 See, e.g., Sismondo (1999); Edwards (2010); Gramelsberger and Feichter (2011: 9–90).
21 See, e.g., Eule in US House of Representatives, Committee on Government Reform (2006: 75); Holdren in US Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation (2009: 13f.).
22 Allan (2017: 137).
23 Allan (2017: 138).
24 Eule in US House of Representatives, Committee on Government Reform (2006: 9); Schnare in US Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works (2007: 157); US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 39, 110, 154, 163, 300, 345); Lubchenco in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2010a: 79); US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2010b: 5, 7).
25 See, e.g., Lawrence and Crutzen in Blackstock and Low (2019: 92). In the United States, the most prominent of these community-spanning modelling projects is the Geoengineering Model Intercomparison Project (GeoMIP) (see, e.g., Kravitz, Robock, and others (2011); Kravitz, Caldeira, Boucher, and others (2013); Tilmes and others (2013); Kravitz, Robock, Tilmes, and others (2015); Kravitz, MacMartin, Visioni, and others (2020)). For a list of all simulations and publications that either come from the GeoMIP working group or use their models, see the GeoMIP website. In Europe, the EU-funded project on Implications and Risks of Engineering Solar Radiation to Limit Climate Change (IMPLICC), which ended in 2012, has received much attention (Implications and Risks of Engineering Solar Radiation to Limit Climate Change 2019).
26 Experts also refer to less ‘natural’ analogues to communicate climate engineering, e.g., cloud formation in ship tracks (see, e.g., Lee and Rasch in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 35, 160)).
27 Carlin in US Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works (2007: 126).
28 Robock in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 49, 51).
29 US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 6).
30 See, e.g., Caldeira, Lane, Sheperd, Keith, and Morgan in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 24, 25, 35, 80, 148, 284); Schnare in US Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works (2007: 67); US Senate, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development of the Committee on Appropriations (2009: 42); US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2010b: 4).
31 Lackner in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 172); US Environmental Protection Agency EPA (2010: 77234).
32 Schnare in US Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works (2007: 155); see also George in US House of Representatives, Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming (2007: 95).
33 Robock et al. in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 59–60).
34 This is how the economist Alan Carlin put it, as quoted by one expert witness in 2007 (Carlin qtd. by Schnare in US Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works (2007: 126)).
35 Schnare in US Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works (2007: 64).
36 See, e.g., Schnare in US Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works (2007: 64, 68, 110, 126, 155); US Senate, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development of the Committee on Appropriations (2009: 42).
37 Caldeira in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 20). See also: US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 152, 157, 309); Washington Post as qtd. in US Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works (2015: 10).
38 Caldeira in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 16). See also Caldeira, Rasch, Long in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 20, 152, 300); US Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works (2015: 10); US Environmental Protection Agency EPA (2010: 77234). For a critical position, see Chisholm et al. qtd by Romm in US House of Representatives, Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming (2007: 39f.).
39 Schnare in US Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works (2007: 68, emphasis added); see also Schnare in US Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works (2007: 111); for the case of CDR, see, e.g., US Senate, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development of the Committee on Appropriations (2009: 42).
40 Carlin qtd. by Schnare in US Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works (2007: 126, 156).
41 Lackner in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 172).
42 Caldeira in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 16; see also: 20, 22, 24, 35, 90, 300, etc.). US House of Representatives, Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming (2007: 40); Schnare in US Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works (2007: 73, 111, 112).
43 US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2010b: 23).
44 Schneider in US Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works (1997: 122).
45 Rasch in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 152, emphasis added).
46 Robock, Caldeira in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 45, 90, 109).
47 Long in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 301).
48 Robock, Rasch, US Government Accountability Office in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 38, 122, 159).
49 Rasch in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 152).
50 Robock in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 44); see also Wigley qtd. by Schnare in US Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works (2007: 111f.).
51 Rasch in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 157, emphasis added).
52 Robock in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 49, emphasis added). See also US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2010b: 29); Robock, Long, Caldeira, Rasch in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 44, 52, 82, 90, 121, 311).
53 Sismondo (1999: 247).
54 Sismondo (1999: 256).
55 US Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation (2009: 39ff.); US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 7, 32, 39, 45, 47f., 82, 110, 112f., 118ff., 149, 152, 158f. 285); US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2010b: 7); Lubchenco in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2010a: 79); US Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works (2013: 25); US House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (2010: 72ff.).
56 See, e.g., Rasch, Lackner, Robock, Caldeira in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 161, 175, 118, 211). Pressing scientific and engineering challenges concern, e.g., particle formation and evolution. Rasch, for example, describes different types of models that would be necessary to inform such an undertaking in the future (in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 158)).
57 Robock in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 50, see also: 7, 48).
58 ‘Fingerprinting – detection and attribution of human intervention effects on climate – must be an important area for research if we are to be able to conduct adaptive and successful management of geoengineering. As this topic is closely interconnected to basic climate science, the program to extend research into intentional intervention should belong in the US Climate Science Program’ (Long in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 308); see also US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 45f., 50ff., 123, 141, 307).
59 See, e.g., Green in US House of Representatives, Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming (2010: 68); US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 34f., 145, 183, 279, 317).
60 US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 186).
61 US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 16).
62 US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 24).
63 Caldeira in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 17). US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 19ff., 36, 168f.); S.2744 (2009: 2); US Senate, 112th Congress (2011: 3).
64 US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 7; see also 31, 34f., 116, 222).
65 US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2010b: III).
66 US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 8–10); see also, e.g., US Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works (2015: 12); US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2010b: III); US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 5, 255, 360, 364); Royal Society (2009: xiii).
67 These findings speak to observations from the literature which suggest that social scientific expertise figures prominently in technology policy processes mostly when it adds to narratives of techno-scientific control, not when it questions them (see, particularly, Smallman (2020)).
68 US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 47).
69 Robock in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 44); see also, e.g., US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 8f.).
70 US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2010b: 11); see also, e.g., US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 28, 72, 361).
71 Sheperd in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 28, emphasis added).
72 Critical positions on climate engineering, in contrast, hardly seem to follow disciplinary boundaries. Meanwhile, Jim Fleming, Stephen Schneider, or (to some extent) Alan Robock, for example, provide rather sceptical accounts (Kellogg and Schneider (1974); Schneider (1996); Fleming (2006); Robock (2008); Fleming (2010). Scott Barrett and Lee Lane pursue distinctly favourable positions (Barrett 2008; Bickel and Lane (2009)).
73 Grundmann (2017: 26).
74 For an instructive summary of these observations, see Eyal (2019: 105f.).
75 See also Hilgartner (2000).
76 Gupta and Möller (2019: 481).
77 US National Academies of Sciences (2017a). See also Hilgartner (2000: 21 ff.) for an instructive account on the role of the Academy within the US state.
78 The two volumes on ‘climate intervention’ measures, for example, have been sponsored by the Department of Energy, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Arthur L. Day Fund, and ‘the intelligence community’ (US National Research Council (2015a: ii)).
79 US National Academies of Sciences (2017b).
80 Royal Society (2017a).
81 Royal Society (2017b).
82 Royal Society (2009: v); see also the testimony of John Shepherd in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 27).
83 See, e.g., Beck (2009, 2011, 2016); Jobst (2010); Miller (2001); Poloni (2009).
84 Stilgoe (2015: 24). While climate engineering approaches remained rather peripheral for a while, they have been steadily considered in the IPCC’s cyclical assessment reports throughout the years (see, e.g., Petersen (2014) for a general account of the emergence of Geoengineering within the IPCC). In the first assessment report (FAR) from 1990, suggestions for technical climate intervention were limited to large-scale afforestation projects (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (1990: 287, 301)). In the IPCC’s second assessment report (SAR) from 1995, ‘geoengineering options’ were included as a means ‘to counterbalance greenhouse-gas induced climate change’ (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (1995: 18, 51)). Notably, this report already applied the definition that would eventually prevail in the successful establishment of these measures in US climate policy during the early 2000s. It presented climate engineering measures as potential ‘last resort options for the future’ that should be kept ‘in reserve in case of unexpectedly rapid climatic change’ (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (1995: 90, 802)). In 2001, the third assessment report (TAR) called for ‘basic inquiry in the area of geo-engineering’ as a means for addressing current knowledge gaps (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2001: 13)). In contrast to the previous report, it focused exclusively on measures of carbon dioxide removal. The fourth assessment report (AR4), Working Group III (Mitigation of Climate Change), considered both ocean fertilisation measures and solar radiation management, yet argued that both measures remained ‘largely speculative and unproven’ and that ‘reliable cost estimates for these options have not been published’ (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007: 15)). Similarly, the fifth assessment (AR5) report pointed to the ‘limited evidence’ both on solar radiation management and carbon dioxide removal measures and emphasised the anticipated risks of such an approach to counteracting climate change – this time, in the Summary for Policy Makers (SPM) by Working Group I (The Physical Science Base) (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2013: 29)).
85 Weart (2008: 153).
86 Keller (2009: 95).
87 Bimber (1996: 21); Keller (2009: 96).
88 Maasen and Weingart (2006: 6).
89 Brudnick (2008: 1).
90 Brudnick (2008: 2).
91 See, e.g., Kaiser (2007).
92 US Government Accountability Office (2010b: 4).
93 Smallman (2020: 591).
94 Smallman (2020: 593).
95 Buck quoted by Hamilton (2013: 219).
96 See, e.g., Hamilton (2013: 72); Stilgoe (2015: 186); Morton (2016: 157, 333). For a detailed analysis, see ‘Mapping the Landscape of Climate Engineering’ between 1971 and 2013, see Oldham and others (2014).
97 Keller (2009: 97).
98 For the controversial nature of this argument, see, particularly, the account by Sarewitz and Pielke (2007: 10f.).
99 Hart and Victor (1993); Hannigan (2006: 157f.).
100 US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 5, 48, 54, 123, 172, 263ff.); US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2010b: 28f.).
101 Mukerji (2014). With this concept, Mukerji draws attention to the fact that by funding scientific research in various forms, the government maintains a pool of relevant expertise as a kind of reserve of problem-solvers ‘if push came to shove’ (Mukerji (2014: 66)).
102 Of course, there is some overlap in their appearance: representatives of these expert agencies have also shaped the politics of climate engineering by actively framing the stakes of the debate, for example, by testifying before Congress and contributing to assessment reports. But more importantly than providing ‘staged advice’, these agencies suggest how climate engineering expert capacities have been built up within the federal bureaucracy over the years.
103 US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2010b: 10).
104 US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2010b: 11).
105 See, e.g., US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 81f., 114, 120, 149).
106 Alan Robock’s research on SRM at Rutgers University, for example, was supported by a grant on ‘Collaborative Research in Evaluation of Suggestions to Geoengineer the Climate System Using Stratospheric Aerosols and Sun Shading’, (February 1, 2008 – January 31, 2011, $554,429) (Robock in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 50, see also 223, 263, 272)).
107 See Introduction and Chapter 1 for concrete examples on how NOAA has emerged since the early 2000s as a central target of political efforts to steer the development of both SRM and CDR expert capacities within the state.
108 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (1974: 2).
109 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (1974: 1).
110 See, e.g., Feely in US Senate, Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (2007: 83); Solomon in: US House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies of the Committee on Appropriations (2009: 305); Lubchenco in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2010a: 79); US Government Accountability Office (2010b: 20f.); Bracmort and Lattanzio (2013: 28).
111 US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2010b: 14, see also: 17); US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2010a: 7); US House of Representatives, 112th Congress (2012: 38).
112 US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2010b: 16). Particularly the Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research (OAR) and the National Environmental Satellite Data and Information Service (NESDIS) were listed as pertinent in this regard (US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2010b: 12f.)).
113 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2017).
114 The agency was equipped with an organisational unit specifically designated to ‘documenting and preserving the agency’s remarkable history ‘(National Aeronautics and Space Agency (2017a)). And this division, in turn, has its own organisational history that is documented and preserved.
115 Dick (2008).
116 Dick (2008).
117 See, e.g., Robock in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 91, 120); US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2010b: 22, 25). NASA instruments, such as the SAGE series (Stratospheric Aerosol and Gas Experiment), Landsat, or MODIS (Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer) were recurrent themes of the congressional inventory of climate engineering relevant expert capacities.
118 US Government Accountability Office in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 263ff.); Bracmort and Lattanzio (2013: 28).
119 National Aeronautics and Space Agency (2017b).
120 Andrews (2010: 227).
121 See, particularly, the GAO report as quoted in US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 266); US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2010b: 26); Bracmort and Lattanzio (2013: 27f.).
122 Bracmort and Lattanzio (2013: 27).
123 US Environmental Protection Agency EPA (2010). The aforementioned GAO Report (on a coordinated federal strategy on climate engineering) was referenced as the essential legislative history here (US Environmental Protection Agency EPA (2010: 77237)). See also Bracmort and Lattanzio (2013: 12).
124 US Environmental Protection Agency (2015a).
125 US Environmental Protection Agency (2015b: 64966).
126 H.R.2454 (2009: 860).
127 US Environmental Protection Agency (2015a: 64903). This ruling is also reflected in the EPA’s proposed federal plan to implement these guidelines. Here, it was stated that emission rate credits (ERC) ‘may not be issued to […] direct air capture […]’ technologies (US Environmental Protection Agency (2015b: 65094)).
128 US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2010b: 22).
129 US House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Technology (2009: 28).
130 Bracmort and Lattanzio (2013: 28).
131 See, e.g., US House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Energy of the Committee on Science (2003); US Department of Energy (2004: 21515); US House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Energy of the Committee on Science (2006); US House of Representatives, Committee on Government Reform (2006); H.R.3607 (2019); US House of Representatives, Select Committee on the Climate Crisis (2020).
132 Grundmann (2017: 26).