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‌Digital knowledge from below: Low-skilled labour migration to the Gulf countries and technology adoption in India

‌Javed Mohammad Alam

After two years of hard work in the Gulf, 51-year-old Shafiq was finally returning home. His luggage included dates and perfumes, but the most precious items he carried were a mobile phone, a TV, and a laptop. In his view, these devices were not merely material rewards and symbols of his labour but tools that would help his family climb the social ladder and enter a world they had been excluded from so far. However, merely owning these devices was just the first step. The mobile phone, an iPhone of a previous generation, promised social prestige but also live communication with relatives and friends scattered in multiple Indian states and abroad, providing a vital link to the world beyond the village. The TV, a refurbished model from a reputable brand, had been said by the seller to offer reliable performance. It would become a source of entertainment and information, providing knowledge and the opportunity to make Shafiq’s home a sought-after place by the neighbours and close family. For many in Shafiq’s village, a TV of this quality was a luxury, and its presence in his home would mark a significant step towards improved access to media and news. The laptop held opportunities for learning and accessing information online – even though it was not yet fully clear what its use would be. Intermittent power supply and internet connectivity issues in their rural setting were still presenting significant challenges, but there would be ways to overcome these problems. The laptop was to become particularly important for Shafiq’s eldest son, who needed it for learning new skills, as repeated on cardboard signs planted along the road going from the village to the closest city. With access to online courses and tutorials, he would turn the laptop into a tool for self-education and overcome the limitations of the public school he was attending. This would then bridge the gap between Shafiq’s rural upbringing and the demands of a technology-driven economy; it would also fulfil Shafiq’s wife’s claims – although herself uneducated, she was prioritising the children’s education, understanding its importance for their future. While migrant families like Shafiq’s were starting to integrate these technologies, many non-migrant families in his village still lacked such devices, highlighting a significant and persistent divide in access to technology. This divide was not just about access but also about the ability to use technology effectively. Shafiq’s return would initiate a shift for the family to engage with ongoing digital transformations.

This story, based on discussions with one migrant labourer and his family in northern India, is not unique. Across India, particularly among marginalised communities, returning migrants are bringing back more than material wealth – they are carrying with them tools and knowledge that facilitate economic integration, enhance educational opportunities, and strengthen community adaptability. Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), and Other Backward Classes (OBC) in India represent historically marginalised communities facing systemic discrimination on various fronts, including education, employment, and social status. Despite constitutional safeguards, these groups continue to grapple with socioeconomic challenges. According to National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) data, the literacy rate among SCs was 66.1% compared to the national average of 73% in 2017–18, highlighting educational disparities. STs experience even greater educational marginalisation, with a literacy rate of 58.9%. Muslims, especially the Pasmanda1 community – a term encompassing Dalit and economically disadvantaged Muslims and designating a marginalised subset of the Indian Muslim community – face similar, if not heightened, levels of discrimination. The Sachar Committee Report (2006) found that the socioeconomic status of Muslims in India is comparable to, or worse than, SCs and STs. Pasmanda Muslims often fall into the lowest brackets of the social hierarchy, enduring economic deprivation and a lack of educational opportunities. This marginalisation is compounded by the pervasive burden of communalism. The rise of majoritarian political ideologies, particularly under the current regime, has exacerbated the discrimination against Muslims. The 2011 Census of India already highlighted that unemployment rates among Muslims in Uttar Pradesh were higher than the national average, underscoring the paucity of opportunities at home. Pasmanda Muslims in Uttar Pradesh increasingly migrate to Gulf countries in pursuit of work opportunities and to overcome socioeconomic deprivation and educational disadvantages (Bhatty 1996). This migration trend mirrors the earlier patterns observed in Kerala, where economic necessity, combined with limited local opportunities, prompted large-scale emigration (Chandramalla 2022).

Out of the approximately 9 million Indian workers in the Gulf region, a staggering 90% are employed in low- and semi-skilled positions (ILO 2018). Despite the importance and complexity of this phenomenon, it has often been analysed primarily through the lens of migrants’ working conditions. Their significant contributions to knowledge exchange and technological globalisation have not received adequate attention. Studies of low-skilled migration to Gulf countries have mainly focused on labour-market segmentation, exploitation and the challenges faced by migrants in terms of working conditions, wages and social integration (Breman 2019; Chandramalla 2022; Khan and Harroff-Tavel 2011; Srivastava 2021). One explanation for this situation is the frequent association of ‘knowledge’ and ‘technology’ with high-skilled work. Low-skilled labour migrants, concentrated in labour-intensive industries, face structural barriers to participation in technological innovation; their engagement with technology primarily revolves around the use of digital platforms for communication and remittance transfers. In contrast, skilled migration has long been studied through the ‘brain drain’ lens, which emphasises the loss of skilled human capital in developing countries due to emigration (Bhandari 2019; Dhar and Bhagat 2021). Following research on brain drain, attention shifted to the concept of ‘brain circulation’, recognising the potential benefits of high-skilled migration through the transfer of knowledge and technology back to migrants’ home countries (Tsai 2020). This new perspective highlights the role of highly skilled and globally mobile individuals in fostering the growth of digital industries in the Global South (Saxenian 2005; Saxenian and Hsu 2001). These individuals often have strong connections with professionals and institutions in their destination countries, allowing them to access valuable resources and information (Lo et al. 2019; Pollozek et al. 2021; Rajan and Kumar 2020). Their transnational networks become conduits for the dissemination of technological knowledge as high-skilled migrants bring back new ideas, practices, and contacts to their home countries (Chorev and Ball 2022; Khadria 2006; Lo et al. 2019; Williams 2007). For example, IT specialists and software engineers of Indian origin have played a crucial role in India’s technological development, exemplified by the rise of Bangalore as the Silicon Valley of the Global South (Upadhya 2016; Wise 2022; Zweig et al. 2021). The focus on high-skilled migrations has, therefore, tended to overshadow the knowledge and technology flows happening through low-skilled migrations.

In order to overcome the lack in the literature and understand what kind of knowledge and technological know-how circulate through low-skilled migration, one has to consider that low-skilled migration to the Gulf countries involves different technology-dissemination and knowledge-transfer dynamics. This study is set against the backdrop of rapid technological globalisation and migration trends between India and the Gulf countries. It investigates how low-skilled labour migrants contribute to shaping the digital and technological landscapes of their home communities. The primary research questions include the following: What are the conditions and contexts in which migrants to Gulf countries acquire digital devices? How do these migrants adopt and use technology? What impact does their technological engagement have on their families and communities in India? Low-skilled migrants actively participate in the globalisation of digital technologies, influencing technological practices and expectations in their home country, India. The chapter explores how migrants, as social actors, redefine their relationships through technology, influencing both their immediate and extended social environments.

From October 2022 to February 2023, I conducted semi-structured interviews to delve into the experiences of Pasmanda Muslim migrant labourers in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, and Qatar. The sample consisted of 31 participants, 21 of whom were interviewed online due to their current residence in these Gulf countries. The virtual format allowed for real-time conversations despite geographical distance, capturing the immediacy of their experiences. Additionally, I carried out in-person interviews with the family members of 10 migrants in a village in the Deoria district of Uttar Pradesh, India. This village, predominantly Bhojpuri-speaking, has a mixed population of Muslim and Hindu families with low educational levels and few white-collar workers. About 60 Pasmanda Muslim families live here, most of them with few or no land holdings. Conducting interviews in the village provided rich, contextual insights into the local socioeconomic impacts of migration. The interviews were conducted in a mix of Bhojpuri and Hindi. These face-to-face interactions enabled a deeper connection and understanding of how migration shapes the daily lives and future prospects of these families.

To understand the intricate dynamics of digital technology globalisation through labour migration, this chapter adopts an interdisciplinary approach rooted in science and technology studies (STS).

The theoretical framework provided by Winner (1980) and Bowker and Star (2000) sets the foundation for analysing how digital technologies are integrated into social contexts, which is crucial for understanding the experiences of low-skilled labour migrants. Decolonising methodologies (Smith 2021) ensure that the research accounts for the power dynamics and colonial histories that shape technology adoption among migrants. Anderson and Adams (2008) highlight the integration of local and global knowledge systems, which is essential for understanding how Indian migrant workers adopt technologies in the Gulf, emphasising the interplay between global flows and local adaptations. Similarly, Beaudevin and Pordié (2016) illustrate the adaptation of biomedical technologies in diverse cultural contexts, offering parallels to digital technology use among migrants. Furthermore, Behrends, Park, and Rottenburg (2014) explore the translation of technologies across contexts, which helps us understanding the interaction between digital tools and local practices among migrant workers. Adding to this, Dumoulin Kervran, Kleiche-Dray, and Quet (2018) stress the importance of engaging Global South perspectives by showcasing unique interactions with digital technologies. In line with these views, Mavhunga (2017, 2014) discusses everyday innovation and creative adaptation, which is relevant to the experiences of Indian migrants. Rottenburg, Schräpel, and Duclos (2012) reflect on the relocation of science and technology within the Global South, involving complex sociocultural adaptations. Twagira (2020) and Von Schnitzler (2013) emphasise the materiality of politics and infrastructure, demonstrating how technologies shape and reflect the social realities of migrant labourers. By drawing on these interconnected STS perspectives, this chapter provides a comprehensive understanding of how digital technologies are adopted and adapted by low-skilled labour migrants. The integration of these insights highlights the critical role of local contexts, cultural practices, and power dynamics in shaping technology use and adaptation, ensuring a grounded analysis in both theoretical and empirical considerations.

As an STS researcher and a member of the Pasmanda Muslim community, my positionality significantly shaped this research. Sharing a common background with the participants facilitated trust and openness during the interviews. Informed consent was obtained from all participants, ensuring they understood the purpose of the research and their rights. Confidentiality and anonymity were strictly maintained to protect the participants’ identities. This methodological approach, anchored in STS and enriched by my positionality as a Pasmanda Muslim researcher, aims at providing a nuanced understanding of the interplay between digital technology and labour migration. It highlights the social structures, practices, and outcomes experienced by migrant workers and their families, offering valuable insights into the broader implications of globalisation and technological change for marginalised communities in Global South countries.

The chapter is structured to provide a comprehensive analysis of low-skilled labour migration from India to the Gulf countries and its impact on knowledge circulation and technological adoption. Following the introduction, the chapter is divided into four sections and a conclusion. The first section explores the economic drivers of migration and the role of social networks in facilitating this movement. The second section delves into how migrants use digital technology to maintain connections with their families and foster economic interactions. The third section examines the adoption and use of technology by migrants and their families in a broader perspective. The fourth section focuses on the grassroots knowledge circulation facilitated by migrants and their contributions to local innovation and entrepreneurship. The chapter concludes by underscoring the significant contributions of low-skilled migrants to knowledge exchange and technological globalisation, advocating for a more nuanced understanding of their impact on socioeconomic landscapes in their home countries.

Low-skilled migrants’ pathways to the Gulf countries

Low-skilled migrants are often driven by economic factors to seek employment opportunities in the Gulf countries (Azhar 2016; Bélanger and Rahman 2013; Shah and Menon 1999; Sultana and Fatima 2017). These individuals come from marginalised backgrounds and face limited prospects in their home countries due to low wages, a lack of job security, and inadequate living conditions. The promise of higher wages and better economic prospects in the Gulf countries serves as a strong incentive for them to migrate. Economic drivers play a crucial role in informing the decision-making of low-skilled migrants, who aspire to improve their standard of living and provide financial support to their families (De Haas 2011). However, the journey itself is fraught with financial difficulties. To fund their migration, migrants resort to desperate measures, such as borrowing money from relatives, selling their land, or falling prey to loan sharks, who exploit their vulnerable situation (Kamat and Crabapple 2015; Rosenberg et al. 2017). Many of the migrants come from socially disadvantaged communities among the lower rungs of the caste hierarchy. These communities have historically faced discrimination and marginalisation, leading to limited access to resources, opportunities, and social mobility (Jodhka 2001; Srinivas 2003). Thus, labour migration provides a strategy for these individuals to escape the structural constraints and systemic inequalities that persist within their home communities.

Over the years, India’s low-skilled migrants have formed social networks that extend from their home villages to the cities of Gulf countries (Kathiravelu 2012; Khadria 2006). These networks are made up of people who share similar geographical roots and who have either already migrated or possess knowledge about employment opportunities and visa procedures. The tight-knit nature of these networks creates a strong sense of community and support as migrants exchange information, advice, and assistance with one another. By utilising these networks, migrants obtain vital information about potential job openings, navigate bureaucratic procedures, and form connections in foreign countries. This can include information about job opportunities, visa requirements, and cultural norms in the host country. A young man waiting for a visa, for instance, obtained the necessary information from elders: ‘In my village, everyone wants to go out. The first thing we do is to get a passport as soon as possible. We all know how we can go [outside India]’. The young boys in the villages can see the change afforded by remittances, citing the examples of people who have worked in the Gulf for years. ‘What is possible from Saudi money is not possible in India. People [migrants] have built houses, bought cars and bikes, sending kids to good schools. Can it be done working here [in India]?’

As regards the Gulf countries, low-skilled and semi-skilled workers typically have two avenues for entering the labour market: either through a Kafeel2 or through recruitment agencies. Kafeel, meaning ‘sponsors’ or ‘employers,’ plays a crucial role in the lives of migrant workers in Saudi Arabia (Garratt 2021; Parreñas and Silvey 2021). The Kafala system is a sponsorship programme that regulates the entry, residency, and exit of foreign workers in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Parreñas and Silvey 2021). The system has been in place for several decades, governing the legal and administrative formalities of low-skilled and semi-skilled workers, including visas, work permits, and residency permits. It imposes certain restrictions on their movements, employment opportunities, and social mobility. A migrant who had been running an independent electronic repair business for a decade explained:

I came with the help of friends already here [in Saudi Arabia]. I worked with my friend in the beginning and later started my own repair shop. I have a good relationship with my Kafeel, and he allows me to work independently, but I have to pay 1,000 Saudi riyals (approximately 267 USD) every month. He [the Kafeel] doesn’t care how much I make from the business [a repair shop].

The migrants’ experience with their Kafeel is subjective, and their arrangements depend on their personal relationships and mutual benefits. The interviewed shopkeeper provided further insight into the role of the Kafeel in the setup of his business:

My Kafeel is a government employee, and he can’t run the business under his name, so the shop is under his wife’s name. In Saudi Arabia, the [non-working] housewife gets the unemployment benefits from the government, which is very much what I pay, but since she has a business in her name, she doesn’t get the benefits from the government.

When prompted, he also explained why his Kafeel kept a business that is not profitable: ‘In the end, it is an asset. He [the Kafeel] can take charge of it, expand, and run himself after his retirement’. Migrants from a particular village or locality in India usually go to the same city in Saudi Arabia, often under one Kafeel. The reason for this is the presence of a tight-knit network, usually composed of relatives or fellow villagers who have migrated and can secure sponsorship from a Kafeel under their own name. One worker I interviewed had three generations and seven members of his extended family who worked in the same Kafeel system in Tabuk, Saudi Arabia:

My father came first, and then I came. Now, a lot of my relatives and cousins are here. It’s much easier for those who already have relations with Kafeels. We just pay them [the Kafeels] all expenses for each worker. Here, a lot of people from my district [in India] and nearby places.

Not all migrants under the Kafeel system, however, are free to work independently. The visa issued under the Kafeel system is to fulfil the particular needs of the Kafeel. Hence, migrants cannot change jobs or leave the country without their sponsor’s permission. A driver went through a difficult experience with his Kafeel: ‘I thought that it would be just driving, but I had to do a lot of other household work besides driving. I came back [to India] and had to arrange another visa’. The Kafeel has a significant amount of power and control over the workers, with the ability to withhold wages, confiscate passports, and restrict workers’ movements, making it difficult for them to leave the country or find alternative employment. One migrant working as a construction labourer in the UAE never returned to Saudi Arabia after his first trip: ‘When I first arrived, I wasn’t aware of the purpose of my visa. They sent me to a goat farm. I stayed there for two years’. The Kafala system has been criticised by human rights organisations and labour unions for its potential to abuse and exploit foreign workers (Malaeb 2015). Nevertheless, it has provided a pathway for migrants to enter and find employment through established networks of fellow migrants.

Recruitment agencies, on the other hand, are private companies that facilitate the recruitment and placement of workers in Gulf countries. They often have agreements with employers to provide workers for specific industries, such as construction, hospitality, and domestic work (Fernandez 2014). They are responsible for screening and selecting workers, arranging visas and travel, and providing support to workers upon arrival in the host country. Recruitment agencies have offices in both India and the Gulf countries. They train the workers going to the Gulf countries for the first time, as described by a worker in Abu Dhabi: ‘They kept us at the office [in the nearest district] to train for the work and how to board a plane and navigate at the airport on arrival’. One of the primary issues associated with recruitment agencies is the high recruitment fees they charge: ‘It’s expensive, but there is no other way. If you want to go out [to Gulf countries], you have to pay’. Migrant workers continue to face significant barriers at both ends of their transnational migration. A worker in Oman told me about the Indian government’s ECR (Emigration Check Required):3 ‘I don’t see the point, how it helps us. We have to go for a stamp before we come here [to Gulf countries] for no reason’. ECR passport holders are workers with a lower level of education, such as those who have not earned the Secondary School Certificate (SSC) or passed the Secondary School Examination (SSE), typically taken around the age of 15–16, and who are seeking low-skilled or semi-skilled employment abroad (Zachariah and Rajan 2016). In 2015, the Indian government introduced the eMigrate4 system to facilitate the online registration of workers seeking employment abroad and to provide greater transparency and accountability in the recruitment process.

The migration process is a challenging endeavour for individuals from marginalised backgrounds, who often lack the financial means to fund their journey and initially do not know how to use the technological devices that can facilitate any migration experience. These migrants rely on their social networks to gather information and make informed decisions about their destination, job prospects, and living conditions. While skilled migrants can navigate the digitised procedures of high-income countries, labour migrants face additional barriers in accessing migration pathways and often resort to ‘illicit’ routes. These diverging experiences highlight the complex interplay of socioeconomic factors in shaping migration pathways and suggest equally different experiences with the adoption of technology.

Migrants’ social networks and technological uses in the Gulf countries

The migrant workers’ social lives in the Gulf first rely on the connections made through their worksite and on their housing conditions. In the case of employment within a company, the organisation is typically responsible for arranging accommodation for the migrants, leaving them with little to no say in the matter. A construction worker in the UAE described the living arrangements organised by the company: ‘This is like a hostel, and bunk beds are all across the room. One bed is allotted and nothing else, but it is just to sleep; it’s not like home’. The experience of sharing accommodation among migrants, combined with the pervasive feeling of uncertainty in their lives, cultivates a deep emotional connection to their home and family. The shared accommodation in which migrant workers stay fosters a sense of camaraderie among workers, who all have a temporary status in a foreign country. A migrant in Saudi Arabia shared his experience:

People live here [in the Gulf] in shared accommodation to save money. Eight to ten people sleep in this room, but I haven’t met a few of them. Everyone has their timings [for work] […] Every now and then, new people come and go. It is like this here.

Migrants under the Kafala system have developed an understanding of how to negotiate rules, which allows them to share private accommodation based on what is more convenient for them and on their social connections within the network of fellow migrants, often comprising people from the same geographical location in India. A plumber working in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, told me about his arrangement with the Kafeel: ‘We are supposed to live with Kafeel or wherever the work is, but people doing business live independently. But those who work in farms get a place to live’.

In challenging situations, migrants rely on a broader social network at home for support and assistance. During the COVID-19 lockdown in India, a significant number of migrants were compelled to return home and encountered various challenges. However, their support network played a crucial role in helping them overcome these difficulties and maintain their stability. As a young migrant in Saudi Arabia explained: ‘I came back suddenly and didn’t get my pay, but we keep in touch with [each] other, borrowed from friends and relatives, we managed’.

In that regard, migrants in Gulf countries are led to adopt and leverage digital technology to maintain connections with their families and communities back home. Technological advances, including the affordability of smartphones and improved internet connectivity, have deeply transformed communication for migrants, enabling them to stay connected with their families and to support them by sending remittances, which are often these families’ primary sources of income. The rise of digital platforms, such as social media, messaging apps, and online marketplaces, has further facilitated the creation of local networks that connect transnational migrants, fostering social and economic interactions within these communities. These digital tools have become integral to shaping the transnational network of migrants, enabling them to maintain relationships, share information, and engage in economic activities across borders. Communication technology has helped them to maintain a constant communication channel with their relatives and social circle back home, influencing their consumption choices in the Gulf region. A shop owner living in Saudi Arabia since 2000 has seen a drastic change:

When I arrived, there was no WhatsApp like today. People used to send things and exchange letters with those who went on vacation until they went home. [….] Now we can buy online from here. We buy things as demanded by kids. [….] I took a flat TV home when I first went back [to India]. No one in my village has a flat TV. Now everything is available in India, but things here are of better quality and even a second-hand look like new.

The selection of items migrants purchase is influenced by both trends in the Gulf countries and what they desire in their home country. While interviewing this migrant’s family in India, I noticed older versions of iPhones that remain out of reach for most Indians. In another instance, an electronic repair shop owner had been sending home useful items via courier services: ‘It used to cost about 200 Riyals [approximately 53 USD] for about 50 kg. I have sent a TV, printers, and other items. Now most people buy phones and laptops’. Migrants working with a company may not have the freedom to buy things, as explained by a migrant in Dubai: ‘We buy things which are necessary or when we go home. Before the flight, we go to the market and buy things for our home and kids’. Migrants and their families back home are thus exposed to the latest technology arriving from the Global North in Gulf countries. The longstanding perception of the superior quality of goods arriving with migrants still resonates with this migrant’s family: ‘I have a ten-year-old TV, and it still works better than new [Indian] ones’.

During my interview with the migrant families, I observed a notable trend in which they possessed multiple smartphones, often from expensive brands. These smartphones were brought home by the migrants, who bought them as used devices. This makes the migrants’ families stand out, considering the higher prices of smartphones in India, which makes them unaffordable for labourers. This is also emblematic of the second generation’s growing level of education and aspiration to keep up with technological trends. Migrants in Gulf countries rely on financial and technological resources to build a sustainable life for their families. A driver in Abu Dhabi sent home two laptops and one smartphone the previous year: ‘I have sent two laptops and one Samsung [smartphone] for online education. I don’t want them to say that they [the kids] can’t learn because they don’t have a laptop or mobile’. Low-skilled migrants rely on their family members to keep up with policy changes by the Indian government so as to maintain their democratic rights in their home country. The changing landscape of digitisation in India has created a two-way stream of information. A migrant in Dubai who goes home every two years told me the following:

There is so much work for us to do at home. The government is always changing rules [….] so, to avoid any glitches, I take extra care. I have an Aadhaar5, PAN card, voter ID, and ration card in my name. I ask my son to update and make changes.

The technology brought back from the Gulf region by migrants for their family members often includes used or previously owned devices, which migrants refer to as ‘second-hand devices’. Although they have already been used in rural villages, these devices offer the family members a novel experience that would otherwise be inaccessible to them. Within their social and financial group, they are the first to use these preowned devices – fully functional, previously owned devices purchased by a second user at a significantly lower price than their original cost. This enables the migrants and their families to become comfortable with multiple devices and mobile applications, be it for online banking, entertainment, learning, or communication.

More generally, the inflow of remittances has a significant impact on the economic wellbeing of families who have been relying on daily wages or marginal agriculture. The added household income allows for an increase in daily expenses (food, clothing, and cultural activities) and investment in education, healthcare, private transportation, and digital communication devices. Once the workers are in a stable enough position and have learned to navigate between jobs, their focus shifts to building concrete houses, paying for private education, or buying a refrigerator, a TV, and a motorbike. Workers in Gulf countries share similar goals, as a migrant who had been working with a construction company in the UAE for the last five years explained:

If I was working at home [India], I would not have built the concrete house. All of us are sending money to take care of the family. What else are we here for? […] Children are getting the education; they will find a good job [in India].

This situation also changes educational aspirations. Over the previous five years, 14 sons of migrants from the village where I carried out interviews had completed their engineering degrees. One migrant from the village told me what made this possible:

We came here [in Saudi Arabia], which made it possible for us to send them to school. No one could think of it ten years back. My generation only wanted to find work. Some of us haven’t gone to school.

The fact that all 14 engineering graduates from the migrant village were boys, however, shows the inherent issues surrounding the gendered allocation of resources in the community (Amirtham and Kumar 2023; Antonio and Tuffley 2014; Gupta and Sharma 2003). It is not a lack of access to education but cultural norms that prevent the daughters of migrants from opting for engineering degrees. Many Indian families prioritise investing in the education of sons over that of daughters. After being unable to find a job for three years after graduation, an engineer from the village chose to join his father in Saudi Arabia. The father and son are now both under the same Kafeel, with the father having a school certificate and the son holding an engineering degree: ‘There are no jobs. […] He [the son] was just waiting for an opportunity, so I asked my Kafeel for one more visa. He will help me with the shop’.

Living and working in the Gulf countries is a transformative experience for the migrants. It changes their use of digital technology, which suddenly becomes an essential tool to remain connected to those back home. The latter – the children, wives, and parents of the migrant workers – are also affected by this experience, as the following section demonstrates by highlighting the adoption and use of technology among migrant families in Indian villages.

The adoption and use of technology by migrants and their families

In India, the ability to manage uncertainty and navigate challenging circumstances is influenced by a wide range of overlapping factors based on income group, social class, gender, and caste (Guérin 2014). The wellbeing and livelihood of poor families are intricately tied to the support they receive from government inclusion policies, assistance programs, and remittances. These families heavily depend on these forms of assistance to meet their basic needs and sustain their daily lives. These policies aim to address the financial and social challenges faced by groups at the margin, ensuring they have a safety net and opportunities for upward mobility. In that sense, they complement the remittances sent by migrant workers back to their families. Remittances often form the backbone of the family’s financial stability and play a significant role in improving their quality of life. However, migrants’ take-up of government aid programs is determined by everyday practices, the attitudes of local government bodies, and social and economic factors. They do not perceive these policies as a one-stop solution; instead, they interpret them in their unique ways to optimise their options. A migrant worker living in Saudi Arabia for the last eight years, who was a beneficiary of government schemes, discussed the use of subsidies:

Whatever government gives is not enough, but it does help. […] I sent my son to a private school because I earned more than what I used to in India; otherwise, it was not possible only with food subsidies.

Against the backdrop of rapid digitisation, all of the Indian government’s inclusion schemes (social, financial, health, and education) have moved online and work with citizens’ virtual IDs (Martin 2021; Singh 2019). This was made possible by integrating three technologies, namely bank accounts, mobile numbers, and biometric identification (Aadhaar), to create a verified virtual presence for each eligible citizen (Rao and Nair 2019). The move towards the ‘platformisation’6 of governance, away from the earlier mix of physical and virtual presence, has received considerable criticism from scholars for exacerbating the inadequacy resulting from a system that privileges individuals with specific skills, resources, and educational backgrounds (Bowker and Star 2000; Masiero 2017, 2018). However, migrants are among those who have already embraced digitisation and own smartphones, allowing them to take advantage of the digital transformation. A migrant in Tabuk, Saudi Arabia, saw the transformation as ‘necessary’ for him:

Now, I can monitor and check expiries and dates of benefits. I talk to the village head regarding certificates, and I apply online. […] I go to my friend here [in Tabuk] if I need anything for my family. It is necessary for me.

Remittances help with the acquisition of resources, but migrants and their families decide on the prioritisation of goals. The women of the family have gained some autonomy as they manage the house in the absence of the men. They decide on which hospital to go to, where to send the children for a good education, and whether they really need transportation or a new mobile phone. ‘He comes home after two years and only for one or two months, so I have to go out and do things’, said the wife of a migrant in Kuwait. However, this autonomy is not absolute: face-to-face conversations on video calls have enabled men to take much interest in family matters in a way that was not possible earlier. This example is important for recognising that digital devices can also perpetuate existing social and cultural norms, particularly concerning gender dynamics (Nakamura 2007; Shevinksy 2015). Gender norms are deeply entrenched in Indian societies, and digital devices such as smartphones and laptops and social media platforms have become tools through which these norms are both conveyed and reproduced. Migrants use digital spaces to assert control and power, often perpetuating patriarchal values and reinforcing traditional gender roles.

The daughters of migrants are able to access the schools and colleges within 15 kilometres of their homes by scooter. Among four girls of a migrant family who had managed to graduate, one had finished a nursing course: ‘We had cycled for the school, but college is fifteen kilometres from here, so we insisted on buying a scooter’. During lockdown, schools shifted to online teaching, which affected millions of families across India. Many families chose to wait for the COVID-19 pandemic to be over, while some managed to buy mobile phones for the online classes (Jena 2020). The families of migrants I interviewed already had at least one smartphone at home, which they used for online lessons. One of them described the situation: ‘We already had one smartphone. I talked to my husband [who lives in the UAE], and he brought one more phone with him so both of my children could attend the classes’. Among the vectors of financial inclusion, smartphone-enabled money transfer (or mobile money) tools have encouraged a culture of online shopping, information access, and keeping up with the trends across different mobile applications.

A migrant running an electronic repair shop in Tabuk, Saudi Arabia, told me: ‘I am very busy. The working hours are different in Tabuk. By the time I close the shop, it is after midnight in India. So, we talk while I am working. I decide if something is important; otherwise, my wife and my kids will take care of the things’. The families of migrants in India are also taking part in less traditional dimensions of consumption in the villages. They opt for city-based services over local shops because they are influenced by the perception of cities as key places for finding the latest fashion, as the young daughter of a migrant explained: ‘I don’t shop in the town. It takes a whole day to go just for shopping, but I buy from the city, they have design and quality. […] Here only a few shops are available’. Young, educated daughters of migrants are adding gendered dimensions to the functioning of everyday life by exercising choices afforded by remittances.

For migrant workers, sending remittances has become easier with the growing use of mobile phones to transfer funds directly to family accounts in India. Whereas formerly remittances were transmitted to the family account through traditional banking platforms, payments and transfers now take place seamlessly through mobile money or on fintech platforms in India. (Bhaskar 2013). The funds are securely held by banks, and financial transactions can be carried out through either traditional banking channels or fintech platforms. Despite the uneven distribution of ATMs in rural India, cash withdrawals from ATMs are a popular channel for obtaining money. However, digital transactions have been gaining prominence in rural India due to the popular claim that they are cheap, convenient, and fast, with added multidimensional security to avoid phishing and fraud. Nevertheless, a migrant in the UAE told me that he learned about digital transactions before they became popular in his village: ‘Here [in the UAE], digital systems have been available for a long time now. When I came here [in the UAE], I had to learn how to use and operate my mobile, but now I do everything on my mobile. All in it. […] Now, everything is digital at home [in India] too’. The sociotechnical relationship extends to the network of migrants, which is built on mutual interests, regional ties, and willingness to assist those in need. The network of migrant workers, early access to technology, and the inflow of remittances from the Gulf countries have enabled family members in India to become part of the formal circulation of techno-financial resources.

Low-skilled labour migration and knowledge circulation from below

Low-skilled labour migration to Gulf countries establishes a form of digital knowledge circulation from below, wherein low-skilled migrants contribute to the transnational flow of information, skills, and resources that benefit their home communities. This grassroots-level knowledge circulation is driven by several key factors, including the migration process, the social networks formed, and the adoption of digital technology by migrants and their families.

Social networks, composed of people who share similar geographical roots, become essential sites for exchanging information, advice, and assistance. Migrants obtain vital information about job openings, navigate bureaucratic procedures, and form connections in foreign countries through these networks. Often, migrants follow a chained network, working alongside someone familiar with the job and local customs. For instance, migrants working as technicians start by assisting well-trained colleagues and learning on the job, acquiring tacit digital knowledge that is not formally taught but learned through observation and practice. This includes understanding the use of specific tools; mastering repair techniques for mobile phones, air conditioners, and washing machines; and adapting to the local work culture and language. This is particularly true for the older generation of migrants who arrived with little or no knowledge of a particular skill and had to learn whatever paid best. A 50-year-old migrant, completing his 20th year in the UAE, working at a repair shop in Bur-Dubai and additionally handling any domestic repair work, explains: ‘In the beginning, it was just mechanical parts to change, and now everything that has a motherboard and chip’. He further adds how he learned advanced digital repair techniques in Dubai and trained his son to start a small electronic repair business in his town in India: ‘In Dubai, I learned how to repair complex electronic devices that we never saw back home. My son also learnt it and runs a mobile repair shop at home’. A migrant in his 50s who used to work for a home appliance brand franchise for his Kafeel in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, now back in India, also explains:

I got training from the company on how to use diagnostic software for appliances, change the parts, and fix the devices. Now, I use that knowledge to fix everything from smartphones to refrigerators at my shop [in India].

Of course, knowledge circulation is never a one-way process. Some of the newer generations arriving on labour visas are educated and have diplomas in chip repair from well-known training centres in India. A 25-year-old migrant who arrived in Tabuk, Saudi Arabia, with the help of a friend, is working at a mobile repair shop owned by a Saudi citizen; he describes the differences between the devices they handle in Saudi Arabia and those used in India: ‘In India, I was working as a technician where we mostly work with Chinese mobile phones, and they are cheaper and easier to repair, but here [in Tabuk, Saudi Arabia], most people have Apple and expensive Samsung, and one has to be very careful and use proper tools to open and change the chips. […] But it is my training in India that helps me here too’. These instances underscore the role of digital knowledge circulation facilitated by social networks and informal training, contributing to both individual and community development.

In a broader perspective, the adoption of smartphones notably influences family roles and dynamics, particularly within households of migrant workers. Traditionally, major financial decisions and family resource management were the purview of the male migrant. However, their physical absence due to migration and the introduction of smartphones has led to a significant shift in decision-making power within the family. Women, often left to manage the household alone, have assumed greater responsibilities out of necessity. One woman with a school education and two young kids, eight years and four years old, described how she learnt to manage her family’s finances through online banking, a skill she acquired out of necessity. She said, ‘My husband used to handle all the money matters, but after he left for the Gulf, I had to learn. With a smartphone, I could manage our bank accounts, pay bills, and buy on Flipkart [an online marketplace]’. Smartphones facilitate this transition by enabling women to manage household finances, make online purchases, and access information about government schemes and policies. This transition stems from both the necessity of assuming traditional male roles and the practical utility of smartphones. At the same time, continuous communication via video calls and messaging apps allows men to remain involved in family decisions and provide remote guidance, maintaining family cohesion and support as well as reproducing certain domination mechanisms (Madianou and Miller 2013). As one migrant in Abu Dhabi explained: ‘Even though I am miles away, I can still guide my wife in financial decisions through video calls’.

This digital integration creates a feedback loop in which knowledge and skills gained abroad are reintegrated into the home community, fostering local development and further enabling digital education (Vertovec 2004). For instance, a migrant bought a laptop after the pandemic in 2019 so that his children could access online educational resources for their academic performance. He describes the reasons for buying a laptop as the inability of schools to provide digital tools for his kids: ‘With the laptop I sent from Dubai, my children are now able to take online classes. This would have been impossible with just the local school resources’. Similarly, the use of digital remittance platforms streamlines the process of sending money home, making it faster and more secure. A migrant in Saudi Arabia explained the changes brought by digital devices: ‘Before [digital], I had to rely on money transfer agents, which took days. Now, with digital wallets, my family receives money instantly, and they can use it for urgent needs without delay’. This phenomenon underscores the role of digital tools in improving certain aspects of financial inclusion and economic participation. Migrants act as conduits of information, skills, and resources, and through their position they make digital knowledge circulate from one country to the other.

Low-skilled migrants also display significant adaptability in their use of technology, often repurposing digital tools to meet their specific needs. In some cases, migrants explained to me how they used basic technological skills learned abroad to start entrepreneurial ventures, such as mobile phone repair services or digital printing businesses in their home villages. These examples of creative adaptation illustrate how migrants actively contribute to local economies and demonstrate their agency in shaping technology to fit their circumstances. Upon returning home, they pass these skills on to family members and neighbours, often introducing technologies that were previously unfamiliar in rural areas. This – often ignored – process of knowledge transfer accelerates the adoption ‘from below’ of digital tools in marginalised communities, enabling greater participation in the digital economy. Through this two-way exchange, migrants contribute to digital innovation and development on both local and transnational scales.

The role of low-skilled migrants in digital knowledge circulation challenges the traditional focus on high-skilled migration (Saxenian 2005). This grassroots knowledge circulation underscores the importance of considering the lived experiences and contributions of low-skilled migrants in discussions about globalisation and development. The role of tacit knowledge, informal training, and social networks highlights the complex interplay of economic, social, and technological factors in shaping migration pathways and their impacts on home communities (Di Maria and Stryszowski 2009). Migrants’ exposure to new technologies and their subsequent integration into local practices foster innovation and development at the grassroots level. These migrants are not merely labourers but vital agents of socioeconomic change, facilitating a form of globalisation that is inclusive and grounded in the realities of marginalised communities. By focusing on the intersection of migration, technology, and social change, this integrated analysis advocates for a broader recognition of the contributions of low-skilled migrants. Their experiences and actions are integral to understanding the complexities of today’s migration and its impact on global knowledge circulation and technological adoption.

Conclusion

The story of Shafiq and the broader experiences of Pasmanda Muslim migrants underscore the transformative potential of labour migration beyond mere economic gain. This migration, driven by economic necessity, not only addresses immediate financial needs but also catalyses significant sociotechnical transformations in the migrants’ home communities. Remittances sent back by migrants are crucial in elevating the socioeconomic status of families and enabling investments in education, healthcare, and housing, thereby fostering social mobility and improving living standards (Reserve Bank of India 2018). Research by Levitt (1998) on ‘social remittances’ emphasises that migrants carry more than just economic capital back to their home countries: they also transfer social norms, practices, and ideas. Digital knowledge is becoming a growing part of such phenomena. These migrants’ experiences challenge the assumption that digital transformation is solely driven by top-down initiatives and highlight the importance of grassroots innovation and creative adoption in the Global South. Through the circulation of know-how gained abroad, digital inclusion takes a particular shape for marginalised communities that are often thought of as simultaneously disconnected from globalisation and technology – excluded from global technological networks. The intersection of digital transformation with other aspects of social change, such as financial inclusion and education and the expansion of social media, is evident in the lives of migrant families. The availability of digital wallets, mobile banking, and online learning platforms is expanding opportunities for economic participation and educational development in unexpected ways.

This knowledge circulation is further enhanced by the social networks formed by migrants. These networks facilitate the exchange of information, advice, and assistance, thus enabling migrants to navigate bureaucratic procedures and integrate new skills and technologies into their home communities. Migrants not only bring back devices and technical skills, but also new perspectives on their use and potential, influenced by their experiences abroad. This process underscores the contingent nature of technological adoption and the role of social groups in shaping technological outcomes (Bijker and Law 1994). This uncodified and hardly documented form of knowledge circulation is crucial for local technological adoption and adaptation. For example, migrants returning from technologically advanced regions often bring with them new skills and know-how that can spark innovation in their home communities (Vickstrom 2014). Studies such as those by Vertovec (2004) highlight that the transnational networks formed through migration serve as channels for the flow of technical knowledge and practices. These networks enable the exchange of information and skills that might not be formally recognised or codified by the state but are nonetheless vital for local development. The spread of mobile phone usage in rural Africa, facilitated by returning migrants, is a case in point (Aker and Mbiti 2010). This phenomenon illustrates how grassroots movements and informal knowledge networks can significantly influence technological globalisation, technology adoption, and knowledge acquisition. The access to global networks, in turn, empowers them to contribute to the socioeconomic development of their regions, showcasing the pivotal role of uncodified knowledge circulations in global technological dynamics. In conclusion, while state-recognised forms of knowledge circulation have been extensively studied, the informal, uncodified practices facilitated by labour migration play an equally important role. These practices enable marginalised communities from Global South countries to actively participate in the globalisation of technology, driving sociotechnical transformations at the grassroots level.

Endnotes‌

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